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ABSTRACT 
It has been argued that when analyzing time use data, child care should be treated 
separately from leisure or housework because, unlike these two, its income gradient is 
positive. Using U.S. data from PSID-CDS, this paper computes parental child care during 
and outside of typical work hours (TWH) by income quintile for two-parent families.  
The TWH distinction is important because during TWH the opportunity cost of spending 
time with children is first and foremost in terms of forgone earnings, while outside of 
TWH it is mainly in terms of leisure or housework. Indeed, I find that during TWH active 
child care is actually decreasing in income and, hence, behaves a lot like leisure and other 
household chores. Outside of TWH, fathers partly catch up to mothers especially in high 
income families.  Indeed, mothers' child care is still slightly decreasing in income, while 
fathers' active care is increasing. Implications for theory are derived in a static framework 
of time allocation and child quality production which encompasses the recent literature on 
the topic. Similar to patterns in leisure and housework, the variation in child care during 
TWH can be rationalized by assuming a high elasticity of substitution between leisure, 
consumption and child quality where the substitution effect dominates the income effect.  
However, the facts outside of TWH point to systematic differences by income in 
preferences or productivity. For instance, assuming father's productivity in child care is 
increasing, while mother's is decreasing in income could be a potential rationale for the 
observed behavior.  
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1 INTRODUCTION
While James Heckman and co-authors have shown that early childhood education matters the
most for adult outcomes (see e.g., Cunha and Heckman 2007, AER), recent research findings
suggest that parental time, in particular father’s time, is a crucial ingredient in child quality pro-
duction (see e.g., Del Boca, Flinn and Wiswall 2014, ReStud). Moreover, because the overall
income gradient of child care appears to be positive, it has been argued that child care should be
modeled separately from other household chores or leisure, both of which have negative income
gradients (see e.g., Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney 2008, JEL). Understanding household’s time al-
location is important for family policy such as child care deductibility, education subsidies, etc.
but also for labor policies at the macroeconomic level (see e.g., Aguiar and Hurst Forthcoming,
Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 2). This paper contributes to the above literature by first
highlighting that parental time spent with children is not uniformly spread throughout the week
and time of day. In particular, during typical work hours (TWH), defined as 8am to 6pm,
Monday through Friday,1 child care is actually decreasing in income—especially for mothers.
Outside of TWH, child care is (partly) increasing in income—especially for fathers. Using
these facts, I then analyze a simple model to see what kinds of properties of the utility and
child quality production functions can rationalize the observed patterns. I show that parental
time spent with children during TWH can indeed be explained by differing opportunity costs
between mothers and fathers as well as across income groups if utility is such that substitution
effects dominate income effects. The patterns outside of TWH require particular preference
and/or child quality production parameters to systematically differ by income.
In the Panel Study of Income Dynamics Child Development Study (PSID-CDS) 1997 time
diaries, a subsample of PSID households with children under the age of 12 were asked to keep
time diaries for one week day and one weekend day. Following Folbre, Yoon, Finnoff, and
Fuligni (2005), Folbre (2008), Del Boca et al. (2014) and Abbott (2015), I also use the PSID-
CDS 1997 time diaries and implement a similar strategy to compute active and passive child
care—with a few adjustments. The most important adjustment is that none of these authors
makes the distinction between child care during and outside of TWH. As this paper shows,
this is a crucial ingredient in determining the opportunity cost of spending time with children.
In particular, I show that both mothers and fathers spend more time with children outside of
TWH where the opportunity cost is in terms of leisure or housework, than they do during TWH
where the opportunity cost is first and foremost in terms of foregone earnings. Moreover, I
find that—presumably for similar reasons—some groups of the population catch up to other
groups outside of TWH. For example, while overall mothers spend twice as much time in child
care than fathers do, they spend three times as much during TWH. Hence, fathers catch up to
mothers outside of TWH, albeit in relative rather than absolute terms (i.e., mothers still spend
1I discuss this choice of definition for “typical work hours” in Appendix A.2.2.1. Results for alternative
definitions are provided in Appendix A.3.
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more time with children than fathers do). By income quintile, I show that when restricting
attention to TWH, child care is actually decreasing in income—especially for mothers, while
it is indeed increasing outside of TWH—especially for fathers. These findings refine those in
Guryan, Hurst and Kearney (2008) and suggests that, depending on the time of the week and
day, child care actually does behave like leisure or other household chores. In sum then, high
income parents catch up to low income parents outside of TWH, mothers in relative terms and
fathers in absolute terms. Taken together, father’s time relative to mother’s outside of TWH is
monotonically increasing in income, while it is almost flat during TWH. The above facts are
generally more pronounced for active care. I therefore concentrate on this measure in analyzing
implications for theory.2
From a Beckarian point of view, these facts can tell us a lot about what properties of the
utility and child quality production functions are needed to rationalize these choices. Consider
a model where households derive utility from consumption, leisure and child quality, where
child quality is produced using parental time during and outside of TWH, expenditures and
ability as inputs.
First, I assume logarithmic utility combined with a Cobb-Douglas production function for
child quality. This specification is close to a static version of the model used in Del Boca et al.
(2014), extended to differentiate between child care during and outside of TWH. Here I show
that level differences for mothers and fathers can partly be rationalized by a positive gender
wage gap. Quantitatively, these opportunity cost differences need to be combined with gender
differences in the preference for leisure and in productivity in child quality production. By
income quintile, however, this specification predicts that child care, hours worked and expen-
diture as a fraction of total income are independent on income and therefore cannot rationalize
these choices unless various preferences and technology parameters systematically differ by
income.
In order for time spent with children during TWH to be decreasing in income, rather than
flat, without adding systematic heterogeneity by income, utility needs to be such that substi-
tution effects of a higher wage dominate income effects. While, of course, many functional
forms can deliver this result, one example is a homothetic CES utility specification with elas-
ticity greater than one. This specification also yields that hours worked are increasing in income
and that expenditures on child quality as a fraction of income are decreasing in income. How-
ever, I show that even with a nested CES quality production function as in Abbott (2015),
patterns outside of TWH cannot be replicated. Indeed, this model predicts that mother’s and
father’s child care outside of TWH must move in the same direction with income, either both
are increasing or both are decreasing, a counterfactual prediction. Hence, even a static version
of Abbott (2015)’s model extended to differentiate between child care during and outside of
2The facts described above also hold when conditioning on age of the child and number of children in the
household (see Appendix A.4 for details).
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TWH, requires preference and/or technology parameters to systematically vary with income.
Del Boca et al. (2014) allow for preference but not productivity heterogeneity. Guryan et al.
(2008) also suggest that preference or productivity systematically vary with income as one po-
tential theory for the overall positive income gradient for child care. However, the specific
pattern needed to account for the behavioral patters described in this paper are more subtle than
those these papers.
In sum, while Del Boca et al. (2014) mainly use logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction to get closed form solutions, Abbott (2015) uses CES utility with elasticity smaller
than one and a nested CES production function to capture the dynamics of child quality ac-
cumulation. These specifications are at odds with the specifications needed to rationalize the
static time allocation decision during and outside of TWH by household income analyzed in
this paper. This calls for future research to develop a unified theory to simultaneously explain
the static and the dynamic dimension of time allocation and child quality production across
income groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the child care measures
and data results, reporting child care hours per child per week during and outside of TWH, for
mothers and fathers, active and passive care by household income quintile. Section 4 discusses
implications for theory while Section 5 concludes.
2 PSID-CDS DATA: CHILD CARE BY TWO-PARENT FAMILIES
In this section, I first discuss the per child measures of child care I construct. I then present
the facts of mother’s and father’s active and total child care during and outside of typical work
hours (TWH) by household income quintile.
I follow a similar strategy as the literature in selecting the sample. That is, I concentrate
on families where children live with two parents (Del Boca et al. (2014) call them “intact
families”, Abbott (2015) calls them “traditional families”) and no other adults (e.g., grand-
mothers). Following Del Boca et al. (2014), I discard observations where total household
income, labor income, wage rate and hours worked reports are inconsistent. This boils down to
eliminating wage reports of more than $150 per hour and those with non-labor income of more
than $1,000 per week. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample used throughout
the paper. The data sample has 2,992 24-hour observations for two-parent families with 1,498
weekend and 1,494 week day observations. Disaggregating into household income quintiles
decreases the number of observations to about 300 per cell. The average age of mothers and
fathers in the sample are 33.8 and 36, respectively, while the average age of observed children
is 5.9 and the average number of children is 2.25. Average annual household income is $60,956
of which an average of $5,443 is non-labor income, with the latter varying a lot in the sample.
These statistics are similar to those in Del Boca et al. (2014).
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Mean Std. Mean Std.
Mother’s age 33.80 6.31 Household Income $60,956.14 $4,2345.51
Father’s age 35.98 6.99 Non-Labor Income $5,442.68 $9,818.25
Child’s age 5.90 3.43 Number of children 2.25 0.86
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Notes: Incomes are per year and in 2000 dollars.
Source: PSID-CDS.
Folbre et al. (2005) compute parental time spent in active child care as well as super-
visory (or on-call) care, excluding sleep, adjusting for sibling presence, by age of the child.
Folbre (2008) then uses the same definitions but concentrates on middle income two-parent-
two-children families. While I mostly disregard the age dimension in this paper, I use income
quintiles instead of USDA high-middle-low income classification (see Lino 2001, USDA) as
Folbre (2008) does. Del Boca et al. (2014) also compute active and passive child care by age
of the child but restrict attention to families with one or two children over age three while I
extend the sample to include families with three or more children ages 0 to 11. Abbott (2015)
concentrates on the difference between single- and two-parent families but reports only active
child care.
2.1 TIMESPENTWITHCHILDREN: ANOPPORTUNITYCOSTVIEW
Folbre (2008) provides replacement cost measures of parental child care. Her measures are
useful if one wants to estimate the value of time parents spend with children but was not in-
tended as an opportunity cost measure this paper pursues. I therefore closely follow Folbre et
al. (2005) and Folbre (2008) to construct the relevant child care measures, with a few impor-
tant adjustments.3 While keeping the basic definition of active and passive child care as well
as weighting procedure,4 the focus on an opportunity cost measure affects how time spent with
children is categorized. In particular, to get at the opportunity cost of children in terms of for-
gone market work, I restrict attention to typical work hours, defined as 8am to 6pm, Monday
through Friday.5 The opportunity cost view also impacts how overlaps between mothers and
fathers are counted. In particular, if both parents are active, I count both times as opportunity
costs, unlike Folbre (2008) who attributes this time only to the mother. If one parent is active
and one passive, only the active parent’s time counts because the passive parent is presumably
not “on call” per se and hence the opportunity cost is zero. If both parents are passive, half the
3A more detailed description of the measurements can be found in Appendix A.2. Here I merely present a
brief summary.
4Their analysis used child-level weights from the CDS demographic file to adjust for family selection and non-
response factors. I further multiply time spent during week days by 5 and during weekends by 2.
5See Appendix A.2.2.1 for a discussion of this definition and Appendix A.3 for results for alternative
definitions.
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time is counted for each parent because only one parent needs to be “on call” at any point in
time. Finally, while Del Boca et al. (2014) view sibling overlaps as separate time inputs into
child quality production, I follow Folbre et al. (2005) and compute per child measures thereby
adjusting for overlaps in one single measure. To get at this per child measure of child care,
sibling presence is accounted for in each 24-hour observation directly, instead of subtracting an
overall average as in Folbre (2008). Next, I describe the findings using these measures.
2.2 CHILDCAREDURING&OUTSIDEOFTYPICALWORKHOURS
In this section, I describe active and total child care during and outside of typical work hours
(TWH), where TWH are defined as 8am to 6pm,Monday through Friday. After a brief overview,
I compare mothers and fathers in general. I then provide a decomposition by household income
quintile and discuss how mother’s and father’s different types of child care vary with income,
first in absolute, then in relative terms.
2.2.1 OVERVIEW OF PARENTAL CHILD CARE
Table 2 reports hours per child per week of active and passive child care during typical work
hours (T.W.H., i.e., between 8am and 6pm, Mondays through Fridays) and outside of typical
work hours (O.T.W.H., i.e., all times that are not between 8am and 6pm, Mondays through
Fridays). For comparison, the bottom of Table 2 reports the numbers for all week (A.W., i.e.
the sum of the previous two categories). The Parents rows are the sum of Mother and Father
rows, while the F rel. M rows report father’s time as a percent of mother’s. The first two
columns of Table 2 give active and passive child care as per the definition in Section 2.1, and
the third is total time spent in child care per child per week (i.e., the sum of active and passive
child care).
As can be seen in Table 2, overall parents spend 50 hours per child (age 0 to 12) per week
in child care, but of those 33 hours are active care throughout the week, while only 17 hours are
passive care. These represent averages over the first twelve years of the child’s life. Similarly,
Folbre (2008) finds that middle income two-parent-two-children families spend an average of
13.5 hours of passive care and 27.8 hours of active care per child per week (see her Tables 6.2
and 6.3).6 However, this paper argues that estimates using the distinction during and outside of
6For comparison, Hill and Stafford (1980) analyzing time use data in 1976 find that women spend 7.33 hours
(i.e. 440 minutes) per child per week if they have two preschoolers, which is lower than the estimate in this paper,
especially during typical work hours. There are many studies on parental child care over time and within and
across countries. For a comparison of the U.S., Canada, Australia and the U.K., see Folbre and Yoon (2007); for
Sweden, see Gustafsson and Kjulin (1994); for Australia, see Apps and Rees (2002), Bittman and Craig (2008)
and Bradbury (2008); for Spain, see Gutiérrez-Domènech (2010); for France, see Ekert-Jaffé and Grossbard
(forthcoming); for changes over time in the U.S., see Sayer, Bianchi and Robinson (2004); for trends across se-
lected industrialized countries, see Gauthier, Smeedeng and Furstenberg (2004); to name only a few. None of
them show how different groups of the population compare at different times of the day and week.
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TWH, while imperfect, are closer to the actual opportunity cost of spending time with children
than Folbre (2008)’s overall number (designed to compute replacement costs). Indeed, of those
50 hours of overall child care only about 16 hours are provided during TWH while 34 hours
are provided outside of TWH.
Active Passive Total
T.W.H. Mother 7.50 4.81 12.31
Father 2.49 1.18 3.67
Parents 9.99 5.99 15.98
F rel. M 33.1% 24.5% 29.7%
O.T.W.H. Mother 13.67 6.62 20.29
Father 9.44 4.52 13.96
Parents 23.11 11.14 34.25
F rel. M 69.0% 68.3% 68.8%
A.W. Mother 21.17 11.43 32.60
Father 11.92 5.71 17.63
Parents 33.10 17.13 50.23
F rel. M 56.3% 50.0% 54.1%
Table 2. Active and Passive Child Care, Typical Work Hours and Overall,
(Hours per child per week)
Notes: Typical Work Hours: Monday to Friday, 8am to 6pm, Outside T.W.H.:
All Week - Typical Work Hours, Parents = Mother + Father, F rel. M = Fa-
ther/Mother*100. Total = Active + Passive.
Source: PSID-CDS.
2.2.2 MOTHERS AND FATHERS
Comparing mothers and fathers in Table 2, mothers always spend more time in child care than
fathers do—irrespective of the time of the week and type of child care. However, looking at
the last column of the “F rel. M” rows, while fathers spend less than one third as much time
on child care as mothers do during TWH, they spend more than two thirds as much outside of
TWH. Hence, fathers spend just more than half as much as mothers do throughout the week
at all times. That is, fathers catch up to mothers outside of TWH, albeit in relative rather than
absolute terms (i.e., mothers still spend more time with children than fathers do). Decomposing
into active and passive care, the largest relative discrepancies between mothers and father occur
for passive care during TWH where fathers provide less than one fourth as much as mothers
do. For active care the ratio between fathers and mothers is always higher than for passive care.
Hence, fathers spend relatively more time in active care than passive care.
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2.2.3 MOTHERS AND FATHERS BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME
Disaggregating by household income, average household income by quintile is given in Table 3,
Q1 referring to the lowest income group and Q5 to the highest. As can be seen, average income
in 2000 dollars almost doubles between Q1 and Q2, then increases more slowly between Q2
and Q4 and, finally, almost doubles again between Q4 and Q5.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
$18,138.33 $35,374.72 $49,863.45 $69,220.39 $119,507.84
Table 3. Average annual household income by quintile (2000 dollars)
Source: PSID-CDS.
Figure 1 plots total and active child care during and outside of TWH for mothers and fathers
by income quintile.7 As can be seen in the figure, during TWH the relationship between child
care and income is strongly decreasing for mothers and slightly decreasing for fathers. In panel
(a) which plots total child care during TWH, the richest mothers (Q5) only spend 66 percent in
total child care compared to the poorest mothers (Q1), while this percentage is 84 percent for
fathers. Restricting attention to active child care in panel (c), these ratios become 72 percent for
mothers and 65 percent for fathers. Hence, the relationship is steeper for total care for mothers
and active care for fathers.
Outside of TWH, maternal child care is higher but still slightly decreasing in income, while
it is increasing for fathers. Hence, high income mothers catch up with low income mothers
in relative terms outside of TWH (i.e., the negative slope is less pronounced). High income
fathers, on the other hand, catch up with low income fathers, in absolute terms outside of TWH
(i.e., the negative slope becomes positive). In panel (b) the richest mothers spend 94 percent
in total child care compared to the poorest mothers, while this percentage is 101 percent for
fathers. In panel (d) the richest mothers still spend 94 percent in active child care compared
to the poorest mothers, but this percentage is as high as 111 percent for fathers. Hence, for
mothers, the relationship is similar for active and total child care while the catching up for
fathers is more pronounced for active child care.8
Guryan et al. (2008) find that, unlike for leisure and home production, the education/earnings
gradient is strikingly positive for child care time, especially for working parents. They conclude
7See Table A.1 for detailed numbers relating to Figure 1.
8Household income depends on education and labor force participation of parents. Similar observations as the
ones laid out in this section can be seen when disaggregating by education and labor force participation. Details
are available upon request. Trends in child care by education of the parents can be found in Ramey and Ramey
(2010) and cross sectional evidence can be found in Gobbi (2013). These studies find that parental time with
children increases with education. As the education of parents increases, the gap between child care supplied by
mothers relative to that supplied by fathers decreases. Trends in child care by labor supply of parents can be found
in Hallberg and Klevmarken (2003). They find that a change in the mother’s working hours has less influence on
the parents’ time with their children than a change in the father’s working hours. None of these papers disaggregate
by “time of the day and week” as this paper does.
7
Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
Hr
s. 
p.
 ch
ild
 p
. w
ee
k
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
(a) TWH, Total per Child
Mother
Father
Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
Hr
s. 
p.
 ch
ild
 p
. w
ee
k
12
14
16
18
20
22
(b) OTWH, Total per Child
Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
Hr
s. 
p.
 ch
ild
 p
. w
ee
k
0
2
4
6
8
10
(c) TWH, Active per Child
Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
Hr
s. 
p.
 ch
ild
 p
. w
ee
k
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
(d) OTWH, Active per Child
Figure 1. Child Care During and Outside of Typical Work Hours, Two-Parent Families
Notes: TWH = during typical work hours (8am-6pm, Monday through Friday), OTWH =
outside typical work hours.
Source: PSID-CDS.
that child care must be fundamentally different from leisure and home production. Due to the
limited number of observations, I do not control for various demographic characteristics as
they do. The fact remains that, distinguishing between child care during and outside if TWH,
reveals that during TWH, child care behaves a lot like leisure and home production, while the
difference emerges mainly for fathers outside of TWH.
2.2.4 FATHERS AS A PERCENT OFMOTHERS BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME
As a last angle on the facts presented so far, Figure 2 plots father’s time as a percent of mother’s
time by income quintile during and outside of TWH, for total as well as active child care per
child.9 As can be seen, catching up of fathers to mothers is more pronounced for high income
groups than low. Indeed, during TWH, fathers spend about 30 to 40 percent of what mothers
spend, except for Q1 fathers who spend only 24 percent in total child care and Q5 who spend
only 28 percent in active child care. Outside of TWH, however, the ratio is about 63 percent
for the poorest quintile (Q1), climbing up to 72 and 75 percent for the richest quintile (Q5) in
terms of total and active child care, respectively.
9See Table A.2 for detailed numbers relating to Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Child Care During and Outside of Typical Work Hours, Fathers Pct.
Mothers
Notes: TWH = during typical work hours (8am-6pm,Monday through Friday),
OTWH = outside typical work hours.
Source: PSID-CDS.
3 ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS BY INCOME QUINTILE
In this section, I describe hours worked as well as expenditures per child by income, which will
guide implications for theory in Section 4.
3.1 HOURS WORKED BY INCOME QUINTILE
In addition to observations on parental child care, it is useful to look at mother’s and father’s
hours worked. Table 4 reports hours worked during TWH by primary and secondary care givers
(who correspond to mothers and fathers in our sample). As can be seen in the table, mothers’
hours are slightly hump-shaped and fathers’ hours are strictly increasing in income. The model
presented below will be confronted with these facts.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Mother* 11.37 14.95 20.40 19.37 19.51
Father** 21.90 25.94 27.36 26.58 34.86
Table 4. Hours Worked during TWH by Income Quintile
Notes: * Primary Caregiver, ** Secondary Caregiver.
Source: PSID-CDS.
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3.2 EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME
Evidence suggests that while expenditures per child are increasing in income, expenditures as a
fraction of income are actually decreasing in income. Even though child specific expenditures
are available in the PSID survey, I do not use these reports because, as noted by Del Boca
et al. (2014), the reports seem to improperly attribute some of the household’s public goods
to children. Instead, I use Lino (2001) who imputes expenditures on children by comparing
families with and without children. In particular, Lino (2001) estimates annual expenditures
on children from birth through age 17 for husband-wife and single-parent families with one,
two or three and more children by region, broad income group and three-year age groups of
children. Lino (2001) uses data from the 1990-92 CEX, updated to 2000 dollars. For husband-
wife families with two children in the home, estimates in Lino (2001)’s Table ES-1 are reported
for three income groups and six age groups (age 0-17).10 Since the PSID-CDS data set only
covers children age 0 to 11, Table 5 reports averages across Linos’s age groups 0-2, 3-5, 6-8
and 9-11. The household income groups used in Lino are “low” defined as $38, 000 or less,
“middle” as $38, 000 to $64, 000 and “high” as $64, 000 or more (all in 2000 dollars). Average
income, reported in column 2, compares well with Table 3: for low income, it falls between Q1
and Q2, for middle income, it is almost the same as for Q3 and for high income, it falls between
Q4 and Q5.
Expenditure Av. Income Percent
All $9,489 $56,733 16.73%
Low Income $6,438 $23,800 27.05%
Middle Income $8,915 $50,600 17.62%
High Income $13,115 $95,800 13.69%
Table 5. Expenditures per child by household income in 2000 dollars and
as percentage of average household income
Notes: Following Lino (2001), Low Household Income: < $38, 000,Mid-
dle Household Income: ($38, 000; $64, 000), High Household Income:
> $64, 000 (in 2000 dollars).
Source: PSID-CDS.
As can be seen in Table 5, expenditures per child in 2000 dollars are increasing in house-
hold income, ranging from about $6,500 for low income households to about $13,000 for high
income families.11 As a fraction of average household income, however, expenditures are de-
10The expenditure categories reported are: housing, food, transportation, clothing, health care, (paid) child care
and education, and miscellaneous (including personal care items, entertainment, and reading materials).
11Lino also mentions that there are some economies of scale when having more children. “To estimate expenses
for an only child, multiply the total expense for the appropriate age category by 1.24. To estimate expenses for
each child in a family with three or more children, multiply the total expense for each appropriate age category
by 0.77. For expenses on all children in a family, these totals should be summed.” That is, if it takes $x per child
to raise 2 children, the total expenditure for a one-child family is $1.24x, for a two-child family is $2x and for
a three-child family is $3 ∗ 0.77x. Lazear and Michael (1980) find large economies of scale, while Espenshade
(1984) finds that they are of the order of five percent for an additional child.
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creasing, ranging from 27 percent for low income families to 13.7 percent for high income
families.
Dahl and Lochner (2012) find a causal relationship of income on children’s math and read-
ing achievement, suggesting that increased expenditure is indeed productive in child quality.
However, they find decreasing returns to these effects. This finding is used in the model below.
4 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY
This section presents a static household optimization problem with consumption and leisure
choices as well as child quality production that requires various time and goods inputs—in
particular, child care during and outside of typical work hours. Households are heterogeneous
in their earnings potential (quintiles) which are correlated with children’s innate ability. After
setting up the basic framework where I follow notation in Del Boca et al. (2014) as closely as
possible, I explain why, for the purposes of the present paper, we can abstract from heterogene-
ity in the number of children, the age of the children and passive child care. I then introduce
functional forms and make several data driven assumptions. Given this, I first analyze the log-
arithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas production case, which comes closest to Del Boca et al.
(2014)’s model, albeit a static version. Here, I show that a positive gender wage gap and/or
productivity differences in mother versus father’s time inputs into child care production are
sufficient to capture the average gender difference in child care provision during and outside of
TWH presented in Table 2.
However, because of income and substitution effects canceling out, without additional het-
erogeneity, this specification cannot rationalize the child care choices by income quintile pre-
sented above, even after letting the parameters for number of children, the gender wage gap
and non-labor income as a fraction of wages vary by income quintile as observed in the data.
Next, I show that, thanks to the fact that child care is decreasing in income during TWH, a CES
utility specification with high elasticity of substitution (more than logarithmic), is sufficient to
capture all the facts relating to TWH, including hours worked and expenditures on children.
This results from the well-known feature that the substitution effect dominates the income ef-
fect when the elasticity of substitution is high. This is at odds with Abbott (2015) who does not
disaggregate by income and uses an elasticity of substitution less than logarithmic.
Finally, even following Abbott (2015) and allowing for a nested CES formulation for child
quality production cannot simultaneously capture the patterns of child care provision during
and outside of TWH for mothers and fathers. Instead, this commonly used framework needs
to allow for preferences and/or productivity of time inputs to systematically vary with income.
Throughout, I use numerical examples to illustrate these findings.
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4.1 A STATIC FRAMEWORK
Households are composed of one mother, one father and n children. The household makes
choices during and outside of typical work hours (TWH). TWH are characterized by positive
wages for parents, (wq1, wq2), where the subscript 1 stands for the mother and 2 for the father
and the superscript q ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} indicates the household’s income quintile. Wages are
zero outside of TWH. Households care about leisure, consumption and child quality which is
produced using time and goods inputs. Households decide how much of their time endowment
during and outside of TWH, (T j1 , T j2 ), j ∈ {d, o}, each parent dedicates to work, (hj1, hj2),
leisure, (ℓj1, ℓj2) and child care, (τ j1 (z), τ j2 (z)), where (z) indicates whether the child care is
active or passive, z ∈ {a, p} and superscript j ∈ {d, o} indicates whether these choices apply
during or outside of TWH. Each parent has the same time endowment so that T j1 = T j2 , j ∈
{d, o}, so that we can simplify T ji = T j , j ∈ {d, o}, i ∈ {1, 2}. Since wages are zero outside
of TWH, ho1 = ho2 = 0 and we simplify hdi = hi, i ∈ {1, 2}. Income earned from labor,
wq1h1+w
q
2h2, together with non-labor income, I q, is then split between consumption, c, market
child care per child, θ, and goods inputs per child, e with relative price pe. Note that, as in Del
Boca et al. (2014), “leisure” implicitly includes any kind of housework or home production.
Explicitly adding home production does not add much to the analysis below.
Households rank bundles of leisure (ℓd1, ℓd2, ℓo1, ℓo2), consumption c and child quality k ac-
cording to the utility function
u(ℓd1, ℓ
d
2, ℓ
o
1, ℓ
o
2, c, k; τ
d
1 (p), τ
d
2 (p), τ
o
1 (p), τ
o
2 (p)), (1)
with passive child care (τ d1 (p), τd2 (p), τ o1 (p), τ o2 (p)) potentially affecting leisure enjoyment (or,
by extension, productivity in home production). Assume utility is twice differentiable, strictly
increasing and concave in (ℓd1, ℓd2, ℓo1, ℓo2, c, k) and decreasing and convex in (τ d1 (p), τd2 (p), τ o1 (p), τ o2 (p)).
FollowingDel Boca et al. (2014), it takes innate/previously accumulated ability, k q0, parental
time inputs, τ ji (z), as well as goods inputs, e, to produce child quality, k. Children’s ability may
be correlated with earnings ability, q—hence the superscript. For simplicity, I assume that all
n children in a household have the same innate ability. That way, as long as utility is strictly
concave in average quality, k, parents want to invest the same amounts of time and goods in
each child. The child quality production function is then given by
k = f(kq0, τ
d
1 (a), τ
d
2 (a), τ
o
1 (a), τ
o
2 (a), τ
d
1 (p), τ
d
2 (p), τ
o
1 (p), τ
o
2 (p), e). (2)
I assume that the parent can always enjoy leisure while providing passive child care. There-
fore, passive child care does not enter the time constraint directly but only as an inequality
constraint with leisure. Given the discussion so far, the time constraints of the household are
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given by
T d = hi + ℓ
d
i + nτ
d
i i ∈ {1, 2}, (3)
T o = ℓoi + nτ
o
i i ∈ {1, 2},
τ ji (p) ≤ ℓji j ∈ {d, o}, i ∈ {1, 2}.
Finally, the budget constraint of the household is given by
c+ ne + θn ≤ wq1h1 + wq2h2 + Iq, (4)
where the market child care cost per child, θ, is given by
θ = w[(T d − s− τd1 (a)− τd2 (a)− τd1 (p)− τd2 (p)) + (T o − τ o1 (a)− τ o2 (a)− τ o1 (p)− τ o2 (p))].
That is, children have the same time endowments as parents and whatever time is not covered
by some form of parental child care, τ ji (z), or time in public school, s, needs to be outsourced.
Outsourcing child care comes at a price of w per hour. Note that public school, s, is assumed
to occur during TWH only.
Households maximize utility in equation (1), subject to the child quality production function
in equation (2) and the constraints in equations (3) and (4).
4.1.1 ASSUMPTIONS
Abstracting from heterogeneity in number of children: The average number of children by
income quintile are reported in Table 6. However, the facts described in Section 2 also hold
when conditioning on number of children (1, 2 or 3+).12 There are economies of scale in child
care, i.e., a level effect, but the cross-sectional patterns hold for each type of family.13 Thus, this
variation is not the main culprit to understand the observed patterns of child care. I therefore
abstract from this heterogeneity in what follows.14
Abstracting from age of the child: In the model presented above, the age of the child may
matter for the value of publicly provided schooling, s, which decreases the need for child care
as children enter school age. This difference may account for the fact that, for the most part,
12See Appendix A.4 for details.
13Folbre (2008) also constructs an approximation of the economies of scale in parental child care by examining
families of different composition. She finds that children in two-parent, single-child families receive about 50
percent more active care time from at least one parent than those in two-child families, while children in families
of three or more children receive only 15 percent less than those in two-child families. Hill and Stafford (1980)
find that women in 1976 spend 550 minutes per child per week in child care if they have one preschooler and 440
minutes per child per week if they have two (p.237), i.e. a factor of 1.25.
14A brief discussion of how heterogeneity in n would affect model predictions can be found in Appendix A.5.1.
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Number of Children 2.45 2.27 2.16 2.22 2.19
Table 6. Number of Children by Income Quintile
Source: PSID-CDS.
child care decreases with age of the child.15 However, the phenomenon of high income fathers
catching up to mothers and their lower income counterparts holds both for children before
school age as well as school age children, though it is more pronounced for preschoolers.16
Note that Del Boca et al. (2014) use a dynamic model where children move through different
ages as they accumulate quality, k. The dynamic dimension is not very instructive for the facts
analyzed in this paper, however. In what follows, I therefore abstract from the age dimension.
Abstracting from passive child care: Passive child care benefits the parents because it is pro-
ductive for child quality and this time does not need to be outsourced. But the drawback of
passive child care is that it may decrease the utility from leisure (or the productivity in home
production) (see e.g., Browning 1992).
Now, Del Boca et al. (2014) find that passive time is much less productive for child quality
than active time (see their Figures 2, 4 and 5). I therefore abstract from passive child care
in child quality production. In addition, they do not take the outsourcing cost into account,
basically assuming that w = 0.
Note that, if the utility drawback is absent, passive child care is equal to leisure. If the
utility drawback is so strong that leisure is no longer enjoyable (or housework is no longer
productive), passive child care is equal to zero. Both of these corner solutions make passive
child care irrelevant for analysis. Considering mothers during TWH, if we add up active and
passive child care per child from Figure 1 (Table A.1) multiplied by the number of children in
Table 6 as well as hours worked from Table 4, mothers have only 3 to 7 hours left for leisure
during TWH per week. Therefore, assuming that mothers spend all their leisure/housework
time in passive child care—the first corner solution, doesn’t seem too far fetched. For fathers,
the effect of passive child care on leisure enjoyment (or housework productivity) may be so
strong that they spend virtually no time in passive child care during TWH (see Table A.1)—the
second corner solution. I therefore also abstract from utility effects of passive child care.
Finally, the main fact under consideration in this paper, namely that high income fathers
catch up to mothers more so than low income fathers, is most pronounced for active child care.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to disregard passive child care altogether. To do this, I assume
15Passive child care is increasing between age 0 to 2 and 3 to 5. However, by adding an estimate of supervisory
time during naps to passive child care (not included in Folbre (2008)’s measure, while Folbre et al. (2005) include
nap times as a residual), passive child care is also monotonically decreasing in age of the child—in line with
structural estimates in Hotz and Miller (1988). Details are available upon request.
16See Appendix A.4 for details.
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that u and f are independent on passive child care, τ ji (p), and outsourcing is not costly, w = 0.
Functional Form Assumptions: To encompass the recent literature analyzing parental child care
as an input to child quality production, I make the following functional form and parameter
assumptions. Utility is of the CES variety and given by:
u(.) = αd1
(ℓd1)
1−σ − 1
1− σ + α
d
2
(ℓd2)
1−σ − 1
1− σ + α
o
1
(ℓo1)
1−σ − 1
1− σ + α
o
2
(ℓo2)
1−σ − 1
1− σ
+α3
c1−σ − 1
1− σ + α4
k1−σ − 1
1− σ , (5)
where α’s are positive and we assume the elasticity parameter, σ > 0, is the same for all types
of leisure, consumption as well as child quality so that preferences are homothetic.
Child quality production is of the nested CES variety and given by:
f(.) ≡ R
{[{
δd1(τ
d
1 )
ρd + δd2(τ
d
2 )
ρd
} ρ
ρd +
{
δo1(τ
o
1 )
ρo + δo2(τ
o
2 )
ρo
} ρ
ρo
] ζ
ρ
+ δ3e
ζ
} 1
ζ
(kq0)
δ4 ; (6)
where R is the scaling factor, ρd ∈ (−∞, 1) and ρo ∈ (−∞, 1), capture the degree of sub-
stitutability between mother’s and father’s time during and outside of TWH, respectively, ρ ∈
(−∞, 1) captures complementarities between child care during and outside TWH, while ζ ∈
(−∞, 1) captures complementarities between overall time and goods inputs and, finally, the δ’s
are positive and represent shares of all of the inputs. Note that kq0 is a fixed factor here. Hence,
we need δd1 + δd2 + δo1 + δo2 + δ3 ≤ 1 for the production function to be overall concave.
To get as close as possible to a (static) version of the model in Del Boca et al. (2014),
one would assume σ → 1 in u(.) and ζ → 0, ρ → 0, ρd → 0 and ρo → 0 in f(.). This
gives logarithmic utility with a Cobb-Douglas production function. Similarly, to get as close
as possible to a (static) version of the model in Abbott (2015), one would assume that σ = 2
(i.e., he assumes a Frisch elasticity of 0.5 which results in the same elasticity for consumption
and leisure as specified above), but let ζ ∈ (−∞, 1), ρ ∈ (−∞, 1) and ρd ∈ (−∞, 1) and
ρo ∈ (−∞, 1). Hence, while neither distinguishes between child care during and outside of
TWH, Abbott (2015) allows for goods and time inputs as well as time inputs of mothers and
fathers to be more/less substitutable than in Del Boca et al. (2014). In the end, he finds that
they are all more substitutable (see his equation (3) and Table 4).
Data driven assumptions: Further, I make a few data driven assumptions based on Table 7.
Throughout, I assume wqi increasing in q for both parents, i ∈ {1, 2} (see Table 7, rows 1 and
2). This evidence suggests that heterogeneity in earnings ability captures the quintiles based
on total household income used in Section 2.2.3. In light of evidence on positive assortative
matching and a positive wage gap (see Table 7, row 3), I assume that wq1 < wq2 for all q but start
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with wq1 = λwq2, λ ∈ (0, 1) for all q. That is, while mother’s earnings potential depends on q,
the wage gap, λ, itself is independent on q. Further, since non-labor income often represents
the proceeds of some earlier labor income, correlated with current labor income (see Table 7,
rows 4 and 5), I assume that, I q is increasing in q but start with I q = φ1wq1 and Iq = φ2wq2 for
all q which implies φ2 = λφ1. That is, φi are also independent on q.17
Finally, letW q ≡ (wq1 +wq2)T d+ Iq be wealth during TWH. Under the above assumptions,
W q
wq1
=
(
1 + 1λ
)
T d + φ1 and W qwq2 = (λ+ 1) T
d + φ2. Note that wealth outside of typical work
hours is simply T o.
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Mother’s Wage (wq1) $11.14 $6.80 $8.03 $8.94 $11.19 $20.76
Father’s Wage (wq2) $16.06 $8.17 $10.66 $12.62 $17.68 $31.15
Ratio M/F (λ) 69.41% 83.29% 75.33% 70.84% 63.32% 66.66
Non-Lab. Inc. (I q) $5,303 $3,550 $3,725 $5,239 $5,065 $8,934
Ratio NLI/F (φ2) 330.25 434.61 349.39 415.12 286.54 286.82
Table 7. Hourly wages and annual non-labor income by quintile (2000 dollars)
Source: PSID-CDS.
4.2 LEVEL DIFFERENCES BETWEENMOTHERS AND FATHERS
To start, assume logarithmic utility (σ → 1) and a Cobb-Douglas child quality production
function (ζ → 0, ρ → 0, ρd → 0, ρo → 0). In this case, after substituting out k in the
utility function, the decision problems during and outside of TWH are completely separable.
It is then straightforward to show that child care during and outside of TWH are given by (see
Appendix A.5 for details):
τd,q1 =
α4δd1
nΓd
[(
1 +
1
λ
)
T d + φ1
]
; τd,q2 =
α4δd2
nΓd
[
(λ+ 1)T d + φ2
]
; (7)
τ o,qi =
α4δoi
nΓoi
T o. (8)
where Γd ≡ αd1 + αd2 + α3 + α4(δd1 + δd2 + δ3) and Γoi ≡ αoi + α4δoi .
During TWH (equations (7)), to replicate level differences by gender displayed in Table 2,
a positive gender wage gap (λ < 1) and/or mothers being more productive in producing child
quality (δd1 > δd2) are sufficient, at least qualitatively.18
17The assumptions on n, λ and φ2 are relaxed in Appendix A.5.1.
18Sayer et al. (2004) find that the ratio of time spent on child care by married mothers relative to married fathers
decreased since 1965. According to this model, their observation may be due to the progressive closing of the
gender wage gap (see e.g., Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan, 2015).
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Outside of TWH (equation (8)), to capture level differences by gender displayed in Table 2,
we need that mothers like child quality relatively more than fathers do, compared to leisure
(αo1 < αo2) and/or that mothers are more productive in producing child quality (δo1 > δo2).
Del Boca et al. (2014) also find that mother’s time is more productive than father’s, δ1 > δ2,
at least until the child is age 10, and that mothers put less weight on leisure (housework) than
fathers do, α1 < α2, at least for families with two children.
4.3 TIME AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION BY INCOME QUINTILE
While the logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas production specification easily replicates level
differences in child care by mothers and fathers, it predicts that child care, leisure and hours
worked are independent on wages and therefore on quintiles, q. Hence, unless the number
of children (n), the wage gap (λ), non-labor income as a fraction of wages (φi), preferences
(αdi ,α4) or technology (δdi ), systematically differ with q, this model cannot capture the fact
that during TWH, both mother’s and father’s child care are decreasing in q, and that outside
of TWH, mother’s child care is decreasing in q while father’s child care is increasing in q. In
addition to observations on parental child care, since time endowments are independent on q,
the model with logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas production predicts that hours worked,
hi, are also independent on q. But looking at mothers’ and fathers’ hours worked in Table 4,
this is clearly counterfactual. Finally, given the number of children, n, this model predicts
that expenditures per child, e, are a constant faction of total household income,W q. However,
evidence suggests that expenditures as a fraction of income are actually decreasing in income
(see Table 5). Even letting the parameters for the number of children (nq), the wage gap (λq)
and non-labor income as a fraction of wages (φqi ) vary by income quintile as suggested by data
in Tables 7 and 6 does not save this specification (see Online Appendices A.5.1 and A.5.2 for
details).
Systematic variation by income quintile in preferences (αdi ,α4) or productivity (δdi ) would
have to move in the same direction for mothers and fathers during TWH as well as mothers
outside of TWH and in the opposite direction for fathers outside of TWH (e.g, δd,q1 , δd,q2 and δo,q1
decreasing in q and δo,q2 increasing in q).
Del Boca et al. (2014) allow for preference heterogeneity, α’s, in their structural estimation
but assume that productivity parameters are the same across households. They find a small
negative correlation between preferences for consumption and leisure of the mother for fami-
lies with one child, albeit with a large standard error. Instead, for families with two children
preferences for consumption and leisure are negatively correlated with preferences for child
quality. Since they do not report the correlation between α’s and wages, it is hard to assess how
preferences vary with income. In a separate experiment (reported in their footnote 11), they
allow for productivity parameters to be a function of education. They find no evidence that
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these parameters differ significantly by parental education. Distinguishing between child care
during and outside of TWH may well change this result.
In what follows, I show that letting utility move away from the logarithmic case, σ ∈
(0, 1), helps replicate time allocation patterns during TWH but that preferences (αdi ,α4) and/or
technology (δdi ) parameters still need to systematically vary with q, to rationalize child care
patterns outside of TWH, albeit in a less complicated way than for logarithmic utility.
4.3.1 TIME AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION BY INCOME QUINTILE DURING
TYPICAL WORK HOURS
Once we allow the elasticity of substitution to be higher than in the logarithmic case (σ ∈
(0, 1)), patterns of child care and hours worked by income quintile during TWH can be matched
fairly closely. Also, expenditure per child, pee, are now decreasing as a fraction of household
income, wq1hq1 + wq2hq2 + Iq. While closed form solutions are no longer available, a numerical
example illustrates this result.
Figure 3 plots model predictions (dashed lines) and data (solid lines) by income quintile for
(a) child care during TWH, (b) child care outside of TWH, (c) hours worked and (d) expen-
ditures per child. In this simulation, the only source of heterogeneity across income quintiles
is father’s wage, wq2, taken from Table 7, row 2. In order to concentrate on the effect of the
elasticity of substitution, σ, the parameters n, λ and φ2 are set to their average values. Mother’s
wage, wq1 = λwq2, and innate ability kq0 = γwq2, with γ = 1, which is without loss of generality
here. Since the positive gender wage gap alone did not generate enough of a level difference
in child care between mothers and fathers, as per the result in Section 4.2, productivity and
preference parameters are allowed to vary by gender. They were set such that δd1 > δd2 , δo1 > δo2,
αd1 < α
d
2 and αo1 < αo2. Finally, to get hours worked to be increasing and child care during
TWH to be decreasing, the parameter governing the elasticity of substitution between leisure,
consumption and child quality is set within σ ∈ (0, 1). This generates the desired result during
TWH because the substitution effect of a higher wage dominates the income effect. The exact
parameter values can be found in Appendix A.6, Table A.22.
As can be seen in Figure 3, the model matches level differences between mothers and
fathers in terms of child care as well as hours worked quite well. By income quintile, (a) child
care during TWH is more decreasing for mothers than fathers, while (c) hours worked are
increasing for both. For mothers, the model misses out on the slight hump shape in child care
during TWH from Q3 to Q5 as well as on the slight decrease in hours worked from Q3 to Q5
observed in the data. Finally, (d) expenditures per child as a fraction of household income are
decreasing as suggested by data in Table 5. Overall, a higher elasticity of substitution goes a
long way in replicating time allocation patterns during TWH as well as expenditure patterns by
income quintile. However, the model predicts (b) a slightly decreasing pattern outside of TWH
18
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Figure 3. Numerical Example: CES Utility with σ < 1
for both mothers and fathers. The reason why child care outside of TWH is affected at all is
because, unlike for logarithmic utility, the decision problems during and outside of TWH are
not separable.
4.3.2 TIMEALLOCATIONBY INCOMEQUINTILEOUTSIDEOFTYPICALWORK
HOURS
While moving away from logarithmic utility towards a higher elasticity of substitution gener-
ates the main features of time allocation during TWH, it does not deliver the facts outside of
TWH. In fact, this is a very general result that holds for all parameter values for the nested CES
production function specified in equation (6).
Indeed, Proposition 1 shows that whenever parameters are such that father’s child care
outside of TWH are increasing in q as observed in the data, then the model counterfactually
predicts that mother’s child care outside of TWH is also increasing in q.
Proposition 1. Assume functional forms for utility in equation (5) and child quality production
in equation (6). Also assume heterogeneity is described by wq2, wq1 = λwq2, kq0 = γwq2, while
all other parameters are independent on q. Further, suppose the solution is interior. Let ϕ qi ≡
τo,q+1i
τo,qi
, i ∈ {1, 2}, q ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Then, ϕq2 > 1 implies ϕq1 > 1.
Proof. From the first-order conditions for leisure and child care outside of TWH, we get, for
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q ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}19 (
τ o,q2
τ o,q1
)1−ρo
=
αo1
αo2
δo2
δo1
(
T o − nτ o,q2
T o − nτ o,q1
)σ
. (9)
For q + 1, q ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the condition above can be written as(
ϕq2τ
o,q
2
ϕq1τ
o,q
1
)1−ρo
=
αo1
αo2
δo2
δo1
(
T o − nϕq2τ o,q2
T o − nϕq1τ o,q1
)σ
. (10)
Proof by contradiction. Suppose ϕq2 > 1 but ϕq1 < 1. Then, since ρo < 1, the left-hand side
of equation (9) is smaller than the left-hand side of equation (10) but the right-hand side of
equation (9) is larger than the right-hand side of equation (10). Hence, equations (9) and (10)
cannot both hold with equality—a contradiction. QED.
Hence, unless bo,q ≡ αo,q1αo,q2
δo,q2
δo,q1
systematically varies with q, this model cannot replicate obser-
vations outside of TWH. To illustrate this result, Figure 4 plots the results for the Cobb-Douglas
production case (a special case of the specification in equation (6) assumed in the proposition),
the same parameter values as in the experiment in Figure 3, but where δji ’s are allowed to vary
with q. In particular, it is assumed that low income fathers are relatively less productive and
high income fathers more productive in child care. To keep the overall returns to time invest-
ment identical across income quintiles, mother’s productivities are adjusted accordingly. More
precisely, δj,qi ’s are given by:
δj,3i = δ
j
i , i ∈ {1, 2},
δj,11 = δ
j
1 + 2ε, δ
j,1
2 = δ
j
2 − 2ε, δj,41 = δj1 − ε, δj,42 = δj2 + ε,
δj,21 = δ
j
1 + ε, δ
j,2
2 = δ
j
2 − ε, δj,51 = δj1 − 2ε, δj,52 = δj2 + 2ε.
This pattern only differs by gender but not during versus outside of TWH, j ∈ {1, 2}. In the
logarithmic utility case, we needed a differential pattern for fathers during and outside of TWH.
As can be seen in Figure 4, (a) mother’s child care during TWH is slightly steeper than
in Figure 3, while father’s child care is slightly flatter; (c) hours worked and (d) expenditures
on children are also similar to the predictions in in Figure 3. Most importantly, however, (b)
father’s child care is now increasing outside of TWH, while mother’s decreases more steeply.
As a result, this variation of the model comes close to replicating fathers catching up to mothers
outside of TWH shown Figure 5.
Guryan et al. (2008) also suggest that preference or productivity systematically vary with
income as one potential theory for the overall positive income gradient for child care they find.
However, the specific pattern needed to account for the behavioral patters described in this
paper are different than those described in Guryan et al. (2008).
19For a detailed derivation of first-order conditions, see Appendix A.6.
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5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper finds that the distinction between child care during and outside of typical work
hours (TWH) is important in understanding household time allocation. More precisely, I find
that high income fathers catch up to high income mothers outside of TWH, more so than low
income fathers do.
While Guryan et al. (2008) find a positive education/earnings gradient for both mothers and
fathers, this paper shows that child care is actually strongly decreasing in household income
21
(for mothers) during TWH and increasing for fathers outside of TWH.
Guryan et al. (2008) and, more recently, Aguiar and Hurst (Forthcoming) conclude that
child care has to be treated separately from leisure and housework because the sign of the
income gradient is different. Since the opportunity cost of spending time with children during
TWH is first and foremost in terms of foregone earnings and child care is decreasing in in-
come, child care is actually very similar to leisure and housework. Since outside of TWH the
opportunity cost of spending time with children is in terms of forgone leisure or housework,
it is not surprising that, if the latter two are decreasing in income, child care should almost be
expected to increase with income. Hence, the difficulty is not necessarily the positive income
gradient, only present outside of TWH where the opportunity cost is in terms of forgone leisure
and housework, but rather the differential behavior of mothers and fathers outside of TWH.
Using a static model which encompasses features of two recent papers on the topic of child
care as an input to child quality production, Del Boca et al. (2014) and Abbott (2015), extended
to distinguish child care during and outside of TWH, this paper shows that the cross-sectional
patterns are hard to reconcile with these models, unless preferences or productivity in child
care production systematically differ across income groups. They suggest that the facts point
to several potential reasons for the observed patters of child care, including that high income
parents may have a higher preference for the output generated by child care time, relative to
leisure or home produced goods, or be relatively more productive at producing child quality.
Of course, there are many potential theories that could explain the facts presented here.
For instance elasticities may vary differently during and outside of TWH or different types of
systematic heterogeneity could be assumed. However, currently widely used dynamic models
are at odds with the cross-sectional facts presented in this paper. This calls for future research
to develop a unified theory to simultaneously explain the static and the dynamic dimension of
time allocation and child quality production across income groups.
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A.1 Detailed Tables
Table A.1 reports hours per child per week of active and passive child care disaggregated by
household income, during and outside of typical work hours. As in Table 2, the Parents rows
are the sum of Mother and Father rows. Further, there is one row for each type of child care
per child (active, passive and total (active plus passive)). For comparison, the first column of
Table A.1 repeats the overall numbers from Table 2, while the last five columns condition on
household income quintile. Table A.2 provides the detailed numbers derived from dividing
Father’s time by Mother’s time for each child care category in Table A.1.
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
T.W.H. Mother Active 7.50 9.13 8.43 6.60 7.13 6.59
Passive 4.81 6.51 5.53 4.46 4.19 3.78
Total 12.31 15.64 13.96 11.06 11.32 10.37
Father Active 2.49 2.82 2.93 2.67 2.33 1.84
Passive 1.18 0.88 1.51 1.12 1.15 1.26
Total 3.67 3.70 4.44 3.78 3.49 3.09
Parents Active 9.99 11.95 11.36 9.27 9.46 8.43
Passive 5.99 7.39 7.04 5.57 5.34 5.04
Total 15.98 19.34 18.41 14.84 14.81 13.47
O.T.W.H. Mother Active 13.67 14.01 14.51 13.84 13.03 13.11
Passive 6.62 7.15 6.13 6.73 6.30 6.78
Total 20.29 21.16 20.65 20.58 19.33 19.89
Father Active 9.44 8.87 9.17 9.62 9.51 9.84
Passive 4.52 4.39 4.17 4.88 4.49 4.61
Total 13.96 13.26 13.35 14.50 14.00 14.45
Parents Active 23.11 22.88 23.69 23.46 22.53 22.95
Passive 11.14 11.54 10.31 11.61 10.79 11.39
Total 34.25 34.43 33.99 35.08 33.32 34.34
Table A.1. Active and Passive Child Care by Household Income, Typical Work Hours (T.W.H.) and Outside T.W.H.
(O.T.W.H.), (Hours per child per week), Two-Parent Families
Notes: Parents = Mother + Father. Total = Active + Passive.
Source: PSID-CDS.
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
T.W.H. Active 33.1% 30.9% 34.7% 40.4% 32.7% 27.8%
Passive 24.5% 13.4% 27.2% 25.0% 27.5% 33.2%
Total 29.7% 23.6% 31.8% 34.2% 30.8% 29.8%
O.T.W.H. Active 69.0% 63.2% 63.2% 69.4% 72.9% 75.0%
Passive 68.3% 61.4% 67.9% 72.4% 71.2% 67.9%
Total 68.8% 62.6% 64.6% 70.4% 72.4% 72.6%
Table A.2. Child Care During and Outside of Typical Work Hours, Fathers as Percent of Mothers, Two-
Parent Families
Notes: Parents = Mother + Father. Total = Active + Passive.
Source: PSID-CDS.
A.2 Concepts and Scope
In this paper, I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics Child Development Study (PSID-CDS)
1997, where a subsample of PSID households with children under the age of 12 were asked to
keep time diaries for one week day and one weekend day. For each activity, except naps, the
survey records who else is present and whether the person is actively involved in the activity
or not. The data allows us to infer how much time mothers and fathers (including step-parents)
spend in active and passive child care and at what times of the day and week. In addition, one
can compute child care per child by adjusting for sibling presence and involvement. For the
purpose of this paper, I ignore the exact type of activity the child is involved in and whether
any other adults (besides parents) are present or not.
There are at least two advantages of using PSID-CDS data over the American Time Use
Study (ATUS) for this project. First, the study is child-based and therefore also reports time
spent by parents who are not living in the same household as the child. Second, from the PSID
one can get an exact household income measure, rather than broad income brackets as reported
in ATUS. This makes it possible to create precise income quintiles used throughout this paper.20
A.2.1 Number of Observations in PSID-CDS
Since (almost) each observation consists of two 24 hour time diaries, including one week day
and one weekend day, the disaggregation by active and passive child care, week day versus
weekend, time of the day and mother-father-parents do not decrease the number of observa-
tions per cell. Following Del Boca et al. (2014), I concentrate on two-parent families and
discard observations where total household income, labor income, wage rate and hours worked
reports are inconsistent. This boils down to eliminating wage reports of more than $150 per
hour and those with non-labor income of more than $1,000 per week. The data sample I use
has 2,992 24-hour observations for two-parent families with 1,498 weekend and 1,494 week
20In ongoing work, I exploit the advantages of ATUS to distinguish between educational and basic child care as
well as leisure (spent with children) versus strict child care, including children age 12 and above. For the purpose
of the current paper, PSID-CDS 1997 time diaries were a more natural choice.
day observations. Disaggregating into household income quintiles decreases the number of
observations to about 300 per cell. Discrepancies are due to the way ties are handled.
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
M-F 1494 299 297 300 300 298
W-E 1498 300 299 299 301 299
Table A.3. Number of 24h-Observations by Household Income Quintile, Two-
Parents Families
Notes: W-E = weekend (Saturday and Sunday), M-F = week day (Monday through
Friday).
Source: PSID-CDS.
A.2.2 Time Spent with Children: An Opportunity Cost View
In a recent book Nancy Folbre uses PSID-CDS data to estimate weekly parental time spent
in active and passive child care. Folbre (2008), where Chapter 6 is largely based on Folbre
et al. (2005), computes parental time spent in active child care as well as passive child care
(supervisory or on-call care, excluding sleep), adjusting for sibling presence, by age of the child
for Lino (2001)’s two-parent-two-children middle income families as well as, less extentsively,
for single mothers with low income.
This paper follows a similar strategy to hers in that it focuses on active and passive child
care for two-parent families. As opposed to Folbre’s calculations, this paper aims at computing
opportunity costs of children for a variety of alternative activities rather than a grand total or
replacement cost. This opportunity cost view has implications for how active and passive care
is interpreted. For example the opportunity costs of spending time with children during typical
work hours is in terms of forgone market work, while the opportunity cost of spending time
with children outside of typical work hours is in terms of foregone leisure or housework if the
parent is actively involved with the child and in terms of leisure enjoyment or productivity in
housework if the parent is in a passive, supervisory role.
In the next subsection, I discuss the chosen definition of typical work hours. In the two
subsections that follow, I discuss the implications of this opportunity cost view for how parental
overlaps are counted and how sibling presence is dealt with. In particular, unlike Folbre et al.
(2005) and Folbre (2008), I count how much time parents spend, rather than how much time
children receive (see Section A.2.2.2). I also account for sibling presence more precisely to
get at a per child measure of child care. While Folbre et al. (2005) and Folbre (2008) subtract
an overall average deduced from active care only, I deal with sibling presence for each type of
child care, each parent, each income and age group, separately (see Section A.2.2.3).
Finally, while Folbre focuses on middle income families, I report estimates for five income
quintiles. However, the focus here is still on two-parent families.
A.2.2.1 What are “typical work hours”?
Standard versus non-standard work hours have been defined in a variety of ways in the litera-
ture. A schedule of “9 to 5, Monday through Friday” is the most commonly used concept of a
standard work week in casual observation. Seminal papers by Presser (1988, 1995, 2000) use
8am to 4pm, Monday through Friday, while Leupp, Kornrich and Brines (2010) define nonstan-
dard employment as “employment that occurs outside of the Monday through Friday, daytime
hours of 5am and 6pm”.
Given the purpose of this paper, it is important to make sure that the chosen time frame of
8am to 5pm, Monday through Friday, actually captures the majority of hours worked by adults
in two-parent families while not including daytimes where very few people work. The PSID-
CDS data provides “Work outside of the home” for primary and secondary caregivers for each
observed child. For our families, those caregivers correspond to mothers (primary) and fathers
(secondary) for the most part.
The fraction of hours worked falling within “standard work hours” can be found in Ta-
ble A.4. For the 9am to 5pm definition, only 74 percent of hours worked outside the home by
mothers fall within these times and only 69 percent of hours worked by fathers do. On the other
hand, for Leupp et al. (2010)’s preferred definition, namely 5am to 6pm, these percentages are
about 88 percent for both parents. As a middle ground, the hours of 8am to 6pm were chosen
for the purposes of this paper, where for mothers the percentage is 83 percent and for fathers it
is 80 percent.
9am to 5pm Mother* 73.6%
Father** 68.7%
8am to 6pm Mother* 83.6%
Father** 80.2%
5am to 6pm Mother* 88.1%
Father** 87.8%
Table A.4. Percent of Hours Worked Outside of the Home
Falling within Standard Work Hours, Depending on
Definition
Notes: All restricted toMonday through Friday, * PrimaryCare-
giver, ** Secondary Caregiver.
Source: PSID-CDS.
A.2.2.2 Mothers, Fathers and Parents: Overlaps in Active and Passive Child Care
First, I follow Folbre (2008) in defining parents as including stepparents. While Folbre (2008)
assumes that active time of a second parent has no value added and therefore counts this time
only once—giving mothers priority over fathers, this paper is interested in how much work
time, leisure time, etc. is forgone because of active child care and therefore fully counts both
parent’s time as active child care in this case. If both parents are around but not actively in-
volved, half of each parent’s time counts as passive child care—the idea being that only one
has to jump in if need be. If one parent is actively involved in the activity, then the presence of
the other parent is not counted as passive child care: the second parent may well be present but
is probably not “on call”; the active parent is already there.
A.2.2.3 Per Child Child Care: Adjustment for Sibling Presence and Involvement
To compute per child measures of child care, I make adjustments for sibling presence and
involvement in the activity the observed child is doing. With the aim of calculating how much
care children receive, Folbre (2008), following Folbre et al. (2005), deals with this issue by
computing that, on average, the sibling is present for 26 percent of active child care for two-
parent-two-children middle income families and then subtracts half of that time, 13 percent,
from all active care measures. In this paper I account for sibling presence for both active and
passive child care and make adjustments for each quintile separately. As opposed to Folbre
(2008), the goal is to avoid implicit double counting. That is, if the sibling were also observed,
the overlap would be counted for the sibling as well. Since the sibling is not actually observed
on the same day, I have to infer what the sibling’s involvement with the parent was. As it turns
out, the implied adjustment is the same whether the sibling was actively or passively involved
with the parent. Table A.5 gives an example of the sibling adjustment for mothers of two
children under age 12, showing hours per week, all week, all times. I now review how each
number in this table is used to deduce active and passive child care per child. For families with
only one child, these adjustments are obviously not necessary. For families with more than two
children, I assume that if one sibling is present, so are the others and divide by the average
number of children in this subgroup.21
Overall Sibling
Partic-
ipating
Sibling
Around
Per Child
Mother Active 25.90 14.87 4.63 18.46
Passive 19.32 8.65 6.28 9.54
Table A.5. Sibling Adjustment: An Example (Mothers in two-parent families with 2
children under age 12)
Source: PSID-CDS.
For active care, Table A.5 shows that the average total amount of active time mothers spend
with the observed child is 25.9 hours per week. If a parent is actively involved in an activity
with the observed child and the sibling is also actively involved, then I count the time as half
the active child care time; the other half would be counted if the sibling was the observed child.
On average, for 14.87 of the active hours, the sibling is actively involved with the observed
child as well as the mother. Therefore, after sibling adjustment, active child care by mothers is
given by 25.9− 14.87/2 = 18.46 hours per child per week. This is the only adjustment needed
to get at a per child measure of active child care.
To get at passive child care (excluding naps) per child, the procedure is a bit more compli-
cated. Table A.5 shows that the average total amount mothers spend supervising the observed
child is 19.32 hours per week. If a parent is passive (and the other parent is not active) but the
sibling is actively involved in the activity with the observed child, then the sibling is also under
passive care of the parent. Therefore, half the time is counted as passive child care time for
21Folbre’s percentage is significantly smaller than what I find in my calculations. The reason can be found in
Folbre et al. (2005) where child overlaps are computed as a fraction of the time where only one parent is present
(see Folbre, Yoon, Finnoff and Fuligni 2005, Table 5). However, whenever both parents are present in two-parent
multi children families, the siblings are very likely present as well and I take this fact into account here.
the observed child; the other half would be counted if the sibling was the observed child. This
occurs for 8.65 hours among the passive hours spent by mothers. If a parent is actively involved
in an activity with the observed child and the sibling is around but not actively involved, then
we want to fully count this time as active child care but not passive child care. If the sibling
was observed, this time would show up as passive child care. Therefore, I count this time as
active child care (included in the 25.9 hours a week) but subtract half that time from passive
child care time per child; the other half would be subtracted if the sibling was the observed
child (thanks to the next adjustment). This occurs for 4.63 hours among the active hours spent
by mothers. If a parent is passive (and the other parent is not active) and the sibling is around
but not actively involved in the activity with the observed child, then there are two cases: (1)
the parent is actively involved in the sibling’s activity, or (2) the parent is also passive with
the sibling. In both cases, half the time should be subtracted from passive child care (in line
with the previous two adjustments). In the first case, an additional half will be subtracted from
passive time in the sibling’s observation and hence only active and no passive time would be
counted. In the second case, the other half of passive time would be counted in the sibling’s
observation. Hence, the adjustment avoids double counting in both cases. This occurs for 6.28
hours among the passive hours spent by mothers. Therefore, after sibling adjustment, passive
child care per child by mothers is given by 19.32−8.65/2−4.63/2−6.28/2 = 9.54 hours per
child per week.
A.3 Alternative definitions of typical work hours
This section provides the same child care measures as in Section 2.2 but for alternative def-
initions of typical work hours, namely 9am to 5pm (standard expression) and 5am to 6pm
(Leupp et al. 2010). Table A.6 shows overall hours, Tables A.7 and A.9 disaggregate by house-
hold income quintile and Tables A.8 and A.10 report father’s child care as a percent of mother’s.
Comparing to Tables 2,A.1 and A.2, levels are lower for the 9am to 5pm definition and higher
for the 5am to 6pm, but the patterns are very similar to those observed for the main definition
of 8am to 6pm. In particular, as can be seen in Figures A.1 and A.2, both alternative definitions
deliver the same result as the one shown in Figure 2: high income fathers catch up to high
income mothers more so than their low income counterparts do.
Active Passive Total
M-F, 9am-5pm Mother 5.53 3.69 9.21
Father 1.53 0.78 2.32
Parents 7.06 4.47 11.53
M-F, 5am-6pm Mother 8.38 5.27 13.65
Father 2.81 1.35 4.16
Parents 11.19 6.62 17.81
Table A.6. Active and Passive Child Care, Alternative Definitions of Typ-
ical Work Hours, (Hours per child per week), Two-Parent
Families
Notes: Parents = Mother + Father. Total = Active + Passive. M-F =
Monday through Friday.
Source: PSID-CDS.
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Figure A.1. Child Care During and Outside of Typical Work Hours (9am to
5pm), Fathers Pct. Mothers
Notes: TWH = during typical work hours (9am-5pm,Monday through Friday),
OTWH = outside typical work hours.
Source: PSID-CDS.
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Figure A.2. Child Care During and Outside of Typical Work Hours (5am to
6pm), Fathers Pct. Mothers
Notes: TWH = during typical work hours (5am-6pm,Monday through Friday),
OTWH = outside typical work hours.
Source: PSID-CDS.
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
T.W.H. Mother Active 5.53 7.13 6.42 4.79 5.10 4.56
Passive 3.69 5.16 4.32 3.45 3.15 2.75
Total 9.21 12.29 10.74 8.23 8.25 7.31
Father Active 1.53 1.85 1.92 1.72 1.33 0.99
Passive 0.78 0.65 1.06 0.76 0.76 0.72
Total 2.32 2.51 2.98 2.48 2.09 1.71
Parents Active 7.06 8.99 8.35 6.50 6.44 5.55
Passive 4.47 5.81 5.37 4.21 3.91 3.47
Total 11.53 14.80 13.72 10.71 10.34 9.02
O.T.W.H. Mother Active 15.65 16.01 16.52 15.66 15.05 15.14
Passive 7.74 8.51 7.35 7.74 7.34 7.82
Total 23.39 24.52 23.87 23.40 22.39 22.96
Father Active 10.39 9.84 10.18 10.57 10.51 10.69
Passive 4.92 4.62 4.63 5.23 4.88 5.14
Total 15.31 14.46 14.81 15.81 15.39 15.83
Parents Active 26.03 25.85 26.70 26.23 25.56 25.83
Passive 12.66 13.13 11.98 12.98 12.22 12.96
Total 38.70 38.98 38.68 39.21 37.79 38.78
Table A.7. Typical Work Hours Defined as 9am to 5pm, (Hours per child per week, Monday through Fri-
day), Two-Parent Families
Notes: Parents = Mother + Father. Total = Active + Passive.
Source: PSID-CDS.
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
T.W.H. Active 27.7% 26.0% 29.9% 35.8% 26.1% 21.7%
Passive 21.2% 12.6% 24.4% 22.1% 24.0% 26.3%
Total 25.1% 20.4% 27.7% 30.0% 25.3% 23.4%
O.T.W.H. Active 66.3% 61.4% 61.6% 67.5% 69.7% 70.5%
Passive 63.5% 54.2% 62.9% 67.5% 66.5% 65.7%
Total 65.4% 58.9% 62.0% 67.5% 68.7% 68.9%
Table A.8. Typical Work Hours Defined as 9am to 5pm, Fathers as Percent of Mothers, Two-Parent Fami-
lies
Notes: Parents = Mother + Father. Total = Active + Passive.
Source: PSID-CDS.
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
T.W.H. Mother Active 8.38 9.89 9.29 7.50 7.95 7.60
Passive 5.27 6.81 5.87 4.96 4.76 4.31
Total 13.65 16.70 15.16 12.46 12.71 11.91
Father Active 2.81 2.94 3.21 3.05 2.66 2.31
Passive 1.35 0.95 1.67 1.26 1.34 1.53
Total 4.16 3.89 4.88 4.31 4.00 3.83
Parents Active 11.19 12.84 12.49 10.55 10.61 9.91
Passive 6.62 7.76 7.54 6.22 6.10 5.84
Total 17.81 20.60 20.04 16.77 16.71 15.75
O.T.W.H. Mother Active 12.79 13.24 13.66 12.94 12.20 12.09
Passive 6.16 6.86 5.80 6.23 5.73 6.26
Total 18.95 20.10 19.45 19.17 17.94 18.35
Father Active 9.11 8.75 8.90 9.24 9.18 9.37
Passive 4.35 4.32 4.01 4.74 4.30 4.33
Total 13.47 13.07 12.91 13.97 13.48 13.71
Parents Active 21.90 21.99 22.56 22.18 21.38 21.46
Passive 10.52 11.18 9.81 10.97 10.03 10.59
Total 32.42 33.17 32.36 33.15 31.42 32.05
Table A.9. Typical Work Hours Defined as 5am to 6pm, (Hours per child per week, Monday through Fri-
day), Two-Parent Families
Notes: Parents = Mother + Father. Total = Active + Passive.
Source: PSID-CDS.
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
T.W.H. Active 33.5% 29.7% 34.5% 40.6% 33.4% 30.3%
Passive 25.6% 13.9% 28.4% 25.3% 28.2% 35.4%
Total 30.5% 23.3% 32.1% 34.5% 31.5% 32.1%
O.T.W.H. Active 71.2% 66.0% 65.1% 71.3% 75.2% 77.4%
Passive 70.6% 63.0% 69.2% 76.0% 75.0% 69.2%
Total 71.0% 65.0% 66.3% 72.8% 75.1% 74.6%
Table A.10. Typical Work Hours Defined as 5am to 6pm, Fathers as Percent of Mothers, Two-Parent Fam-
ilies
Notes: Parents = Mother + Father. Total = Active + Passive.
Source: PSID-CDS.
A.4 Child care by number of children and age of the child
In this section, I report the same child care measures as in Section 2.2 but condition on the
number of children in the household (1 or 2 versus 3 or more) and age of the child (Preschool,
age 0-5, versus School age, age 6-11). Tables A.11 and A.12 report sample sizes by number of
children, age of the child and income quintiles. The number of observations varies by income
quintile because I keep the same cuffs as in the main text for the select sample under consider-
ation. Decomposing any further leeds to very small sample sizes. Tables A.13 to A.19 report
active and passive child care per child per week by household income quintile and Tables A.14
to A.20 report father’s child care as a percent of mother’s by household income quintile. Com-
paring to Tables 2,A.1 and A.2, generally speaking observations are similar to those in the
main text. In particular, as can be seen in Figure A.3, for all subsamples, high income fathers
catch up to high income mothers more so than their low income counterparts do. This pattern
is most pronounced for active child care, families with 3 or more children (panel (b)) and for
preschoolers (panel (c)).
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
M-F All 1494 299 297 300 300 298
1 or 2 1045 202 197 209 210 227
3 or more 449 97 100 91 90 71
W-E All 1498 300 299 299 301 299
1 or 2 1051 204 200 208 211 228
3 or more 447 96 99 91 90 71
Table A.11. Number of 24h-Observations by Household Income Quintile and Number of Children, Two-
Parents Families
Notes: W-E = weekend (Saturday and Sunday), M-F = week day (Monday through Friday).
Source: PSID-CDS.
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
M-F All Ages 1494 299 297 300 300 298
Preschool 779 173 175 147 152 132
School Age 715 126 122 153 148 166
W-E All Ages 1498 300 299 299 301 299
Preschool 779 171 176 147 153 132
School Age 719 129 123 152 148 167
Table A.12. Number of 24h-Observations by Household Income Quintile and Age of the Child, Two-
Parent Families
Notes: W-E = weekend (Saturday and Sunday), M-F = week day (Monday through Friday).
Source: PSID-CDS.
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Figure A.3. Child Care During and Outside of Typical Work Hours, Fathers Pct. Mothers,
Select Groups
Notes: TWH = during typical work hours (8am-6pm, Monday through Friday), OTWH =
outside typical work hours.
Source: PSID-CDS.
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
T.W.H. Mother Active 8.06 11.01 9.43 7.13 7.30 6.48
Passive 3.97 4.50 4.62 4.14 3.91 3.01
Total 12.03 15.51 14.05 11.27 11.22 9.49
Father Active 2.72 3.14 3.13 2.95 2.46 2.19
Passive 0.97 0.61 1.26 0.89 1.00 1.08
Total 3.70 3.74 4.38 3.84 3.46 3.27
Parents Active 10.78 14.14 12.56 10.08 9.76 8.68
Passive 4.95 5.11 5.88 5.03 4.92 4.08
Total 15.73 19.25 18.44 15.11 14.68 12.76
O.T.W.H. Mother Active 14.57 15.83 15.12 14.88 13.96 13.58
Passive 5.41 4.41 5.25 6.14 5.19 5.81
Total 19.99 20.25 20.37 21.02 19.15 19.38
Father Active 9.68 10.13 9.01 9.63 9.82 9.83
Passive 3.61 2.56 3.08 4.36 3.73 4.02
Total 13.29 12.69 12.09 13.98 13.54 13.85
Parents Active 24.25 25.97 24.14 24.51 23.77 23.40
Passive 9.03 6.97 8.33 10.50 8.92 9.83
Total 33.28 32.94 32.47 35.00 32.69 33.23
Table A.13. Active and Passive Child Care by Household Income, Typical Work Hours (T.W.H.) and Outside
T.W.H. (O.T.W.H.), (Hours per child per week), Two-Parent Families, 1 or 2 Children
Notes: Parents = Mother + Father. Total = Active + Passive.
Source: PSID-CDS.
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
T.W.H. Active 33.8% 28.5% 33.1% 41.3% 33.6% 33.8%
Passive 24.5% 13.4% 27.1% 21.6% 25.5% 35.7%
Total 30.7% 24.1% 31.1% 34.0% 30.8% 34.4%
O.T.W.H. Active 66.4% 63.9% 59.6% 64.6% 70.3% 72.3%
Passive 66.7% 57.9% 58.7% 70.9% 71.7% 69.2%
Total 66.5% 62.6% 59.3% 66.5% 70.7% 71.4%
Table A.14. Child Care During and Outside of Typical Work Hours, Fathers as Percent of Mothers, Two-
Parent Families, 1 or 2 Children
Notes: Parents = Mother + Father. Total = Active + Passive.
Source: PSID-CDS.
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
T.W.H. Mother Active 6.31 6.16 6.43 5.70 6.39 6.90
Passive 6.12 8.60 7.02 4.97 4.33 5.52
Total 12.42 14.77 13.45 10.67 10.72 12.41
Father Active 2.03 2.40 2.54 2.17 2.12 0.84
Passive 1.51 1.27 1.80 1.68 1.29 1.62
Total 3.54 3.67 4.34 3.85 3.41 2.46
Parents Active 8.33 8.56 8.98 7.87 8.51 7.74
Passive 7.63 9.87 8.82 6.65 5.62 7.14
Total 15.96 18.43 17.79 14.52 14.13 14.88
O.T.W.H. Mother Active 11.36 10.46 12.66 11.64 10.69 11.57
Passive 8.24 10.43 7.00 7.30 7.64 8.52
Total 19.60 20.89 19.66 18.94 18.33 20.09
Father Active 8.62 6.59 9.27 9.62 8.42 9.52
Passive 5.97 6.97 5.78 5.56 5.54 5.84
Total 14.58 13.56 15.05 15.18 13.96 15.35
Parents Active 19.98 17.05 21.93 21.26 19.11 21.09
Passive 14.21 17.40 12.77 12.86 13.18 14.35
Total 34.19 34.45 34.71 34.11 32.29 35.44
Table A.15. Active and Passive Child Care by Household Income, Typical Work Hours (T.W.H.) and Outside
T.W.H. (O.T.W.H.), (Hours per child per week), Two-Parent Families, 3+ Children
Notes: Parents = Mother + Father. Total = Active + Passive.
Source: PSID-CDS.
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
T.W.H. Active 32.1% 38.9% 39.5% 38.1% 33.1% 12.1%
Passive 24.7% 14.7% 25.6% 33.8% 29.7% 29.4%
Total 28.4% 24.8% 32.2% 36.1% 31.7% 19.8%
O.T.W.H. Active 75.8% 63.0% 73.2% 82.6% 78.8% 82.2%
Passive 72.3% 66.8% 82.6% 76.2% 72.4% 68.5%
Total 74.3% 64.9% 76.5% 80.1% 76.1% 76.4%
Table A.16. Child Care During and Outside of Typical Work Hours, Fathers as Percent of Mothers, Two-
Parent Families, 3+ Children
Notes: Parents = Mother + Father. Total = Active + Passive.
Source: PSID-CDS.
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
T.W.H. Mother Active 10.96 13.18 11.90 9.64 10.38 9.65
Passive 5.56 7.38 6.57 5.58 4.23 4.16
Total 16.52 20.55 18.47 15.22 14.61 13.81
Father Active 3.45 3.83 4.08 3.55 3.59 2.16
Passive 1.10 1.05 1.62 0.80 1.09 0.98
Total 4.56 4.88 5.70 4.35 4.69 3.14
Parents Active 14.41 17.01 15.98 13.20 13.97 11.81
Passive 6.66 8.43 8.19 6.37 5.33 5.13
Total 21.07 25.43 24.17 19.57 19.30 16.94
O.T.W.H. Mother Active 13.85 13.91 14.94 14.12 12.85 13.58
Passive 6.81 8.50 6.06 6.01 6.67 6.70
Total 20.65 22.42 20.99 20.13 19.51 20.27
Father Active 9.84 8.61 10.26 10.70 9.28 10.64
Passive 4.96 5.53 5.09 4.68 4.69 4.79
Total 14.80 14.14 15.35 15.38 13.96 15.43
Parents Active 23.69 22.52 25.19 24.82 22.12 24.22
Passive 11.77 14.03 11.15 10.69 11.35 11.49
Total 35.46 36.56 36.34 35.50 33.48 35.70
Table A.17. Active and Passive Child Care by Household Income, Typical Work Hours (T.W.H.) and Outside
T.W.H. (O.T.W.H.), (Hours per child per week), Two-Parent Families, Preschool Children
Notes: Parents = Mother + Father. Total = Active + Passive.
Source: PSID-CDS.
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
T.W.H. Active 31.4% 29.0% 34.2% 36.8% 34.6% 22.3%
Passive 19.8% 14.1% 24.7% 14.2% 25.8% 23.5%
Total 27.5% 23.7% 30.8% 28.5% 32.0% 22.7%
O.T.W.H. Active 71.0% 61.8% 68.6% 75.7% 72.2% 78.3%
Passive 72.9% 65.0% 84.0% 77.8% 70.2% 71.5%
Total 71.6% 63.0% 73.1% 76.3% 71.5% 76.1%
Table A.18. Child Care During and Outside of Typical Work Hours, Fathers as Percent of Mothers, Two-
Parent Families, Preschool Children
Notes: Parents = Mother + Father. Total = Active + Passive.
Source: PSID-CDS.
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
T.W.H. Mother Active 3.80 4.08 3.43 3.76 3.48 4.10
Passive 3.91 5.31 3.98 3.31 4.05 3.41
Total 7.71 9.39 7.41 7.06 7.53 7.51
Father Active 1.45 1.55 1.28 1.84 0.91 1.57
Passive 1.23 0.60 1.31 1.41 1.16 1.48
Total 2.68 2.15 2.59 3.25 2.08 3.05
Parents Active 5.25 5.63 4.72 5.60 4.39 5.68
Passive 5.14 5.91 5.29 4.72 5.21 4.89
Total 10.38 11.54 10.00 10.32 9.61 10.57
O.T.W.H. Mother Active 11.08 10.38 11.82 11.11 10.67 11.35
Passive 7.90 7.90 7.69 8.20 7.38 8.17
Total 18.98 18.28 19.51 19.32 18.06 19.51
Father Active 8.12 7.54 7.74 8.19 8.01 8.73
Passive 5.52 5.51 4.95 6.03 5.32 5.59
Total 13.64 13.05 12.69 14.22 13.33 14.31
Parents Active 19.21 17.93 19.57 19.30 18.68 20.07
Passive 13.42 13.41 12.63 14.23 12.71 13.75
Total 32.62 31.33 32.20 33.54 31.38 33.83
Table A.19. Active and Passive Child Care by Household Income, Typical Work Hours (T.W.H.) and Outside
T.W.H. (O.T.W.H.), (Hours per child per week), Two-Parent Families, School Age Children
Notes: Parents = Mother + Father. Total = Active + Passive.
Source: PSID-CDS.
All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
T.W.H. Active 38.1% 38.0% 37.2% 48.9% 26.2% 38.3%
Passive 31.3% 11.2% 32.8% 42.7% 28.7% 43.3%
Total 34.7% 22.8% 34.9% 46.0% 27.5% 40.6%
O.T.W.H. Active 73.3% 72.6% 65.5% 73.6% 75.0% 76.9%
Passive 69.8% 69.8% 64.3% 73.5% 72.0% 68.3%
Total 71.8% 71.4% 65.0% 73.6% 73.7% 73.3%
Table A.20. Child Care During and Outside of Typical Work Hours, Fathers as Percent of Mothers, Two-
Parent Families, School Age Children
Notes: Parents = Mother + Father. Total = Active + Passive.
Source: PSID-CDS.
A.5 Logarithmic Utility with Cobb-Douglas Production
In Section 4.2, assuming logarithmic utility (σ → 1)
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and Cobb-Douglas child quality production (ζ → 0,ρ→ 0, ρd → 0, ρo → 0)
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the household’s problem boils down to
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Note that, the parameter for innate ability, kq0 does not affect any choices in this setup.
Since utility is separable and the time constraint outside of TWH does not interact with the
other constraints, this problem can be split into three sub-problems: the household’s problem
during TWH, the mother’s problem outside of TWH and the father’s problem outside of TWH.
Let W q ≡ (wq1 + wq2)T d + Iq be wealth during TWH. Note that the only endowment outside
of typical work hours is T o. Since these are homogeneous problems and preference and tech-
nology parameters do not vary with q, expenditures on each commodity are a constant (i.e.,
independent on q) fraction of wealth or endowment,W q or T o.
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Since this is a homogeneous problem and preference parameters do not vary with q, expendi-
tures on each commodity are a constant fraction of wealth,W q, for each quintile, q. That is, let
Γd ≡ αd1 + αd2 + α3 + α4(δd1 + δd2 + δ3), then the solution is
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Assuming that wq1 = λwq2, λ ∈ (0, 1) for all q, and that for all q, I q = φ1wq1 and Iq = φ2wq2
which implies φ2 = λφ1, W qwq1 =
(
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T d + φ1 and W qwq2 = (λ + 1)T
d + φ2 and the solution
for leisure and child care during TWH is given by
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Outside of TWH, we have for i ∈ {1, 2}, the household solves
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Again, this is a homogeneous problem, hence time, T o, is split in constant (i.e., independent on
q) fractions across leisure and child care. Let Γoi ≡ αoi + α4δoi . Then the solution is given by
ℓo,qi =
αoi
Γoi
T o, τ o,qi =
α4δoi
nΓoi
T o. (A.9)
A.5.1 Relaxing heterogeneity assumptions
Here I relax some of the assumptions on parameters made above. In particular, while keeping
preference and technology parameters fixed across q-types, I allow the following parameters to
vary with q as supported by data:
1. the number of children, nq;
2. the gender wage gap, λq;
3. the ratio of non-labor income to father’s wages, φq2.
Number of children by quintile (nq): Table 6 reports average number of children by income
quintile. As can be seen, between Q1 and Q3 the number of children decreases from 2.45 to
2.16 while it is slightly hump-shaped between Q3 and Q5. Allowing for this variation in equa-
tions (7) and (8) while holding all other assumptions fixed, the model would suggest that child
care per child, τ j,qi , should be increasing, then slightly U-shaped for both, mothers and fathers,
i ∈ {1, 2}, during as well as outside of TWH, j ∈ {d, o}. Hence, this type of heterogeneity by
income quintile will not help this model specification.
Wage gap by quintile (λq): Table 7 reports mother’s and father’s average wages (conditional
on working positive hours) and the gender wage gap by income quintile. Mothers in Q1 make
83 percent of what fathers in Q1 make. This ratio decreases to 63 percent for Q4, then in-
creases to 67 percent for Q5. Notwithstanding the selection issues that may be at work in this
measure, allowing for this variation in λ in equations (7) while holding all other assumptions
fixed (including number of children, n), the model would suggest that during TWH child care
per child, τ d,qi , should be increasing for mothers and decreasing for fathers, at least up to Q4.
However, this is not what we observe in the data in Section 2. Rather, child care is strongly
decreasing for mothers and slightly decreasing for fathers. In addition, relaxing the assumption
on the constant gender wage gap does not affect the results outside of TWH in equation (8).
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Figure A.4. Numerical Example: Log. Utility with C-D production, φ q2 heterogeneity
Non-labor income by quintile (φqi ): Table 7 also reports non-labor income (NLI) as well as
non-labor income as a fraction of fathers wage. Average NLI is increasing by quintile, except
between Q3 and Q4. Now, NLI as a fraction of fathers wage is is overall decreasing by income
quintile, except for the uptick at Q3. Allowing for this variation in φ i in equations (7) while
holding all other assumptions fixed (including number of children, n, and the gender wage gap,
λ), the model would suggest that during TWH child care per child, τ d,qi , should be decreasing
in q for both mothers and fathers with an uptick at Q3. This replicates the main qualitative
feature of the data, though the slight uptick is observed for Q4 rather that Q3. Again, relaxing
the assumption on the constant φi does not affect the results outside of TWH in equation (8).
A.5.2 Numerical example
A numerical example illustrates the results relating to the logarithmic utility with Cobb-Douglas
production allowing for heterogeneity in φqi . Figure A.4 plots model predictions (dashed lines)
and data (solid lines) by income quintile for (a) child care during TWH, (b) child care outside
of TWH, (c) hours worked and (d) expenditures per child as a fraction of household income.
In this simulation, the utility function is logarithmic and production is Cobb-Douglas. The
main source of heterogeneity across income quintiles is father’s wage, wq2, taken from Table 7,
row 2. In order to concentrate on the effect of heterogeneity in φq2, the parameters λ and n
are set to their average values (see Tables 7 and 6). Hence, mother’s wage, wq1 = λwq2, is also
heterogeneous across quintiles and innate ability is assumed to be proportional to the father’s
wage, kq0 = γwq2, with γ = 1 which is without loss of generality here. Since the positive gender
wage gap alone did not generate enough of a level difference in child care between mothers and
fathers, as per the result in Section 4.2, productivity and preference parameters are allowed to
vary by gender. They were set such that δd1 > δd2 , δo1 > δo2, αd1 < αd2 and αo1 < αo2. The exact
parameter values are given in Table A.21.
Preference Parameters
Description Parameter Value Description Parameter Value
Elasticity of substitution σ 1
Mother’s leis. TWH αd1 0.16 Father’s leis. TWH αd2 0.27
Mother’s leis. OTWH αo1 0.09 Father’s leis. OTWH αo2 0.11
Consumption α3 0.65 Child quality α4 0.5
Productivity Parameters
Description Parameter Value Description Parameter Value
Mother’s child c. TWH δd1 0.16 Father’s child c. TWH δd2 0.27
Mother’s child c. OTWH δo1 0.09 Father’s child c. OTWH δo2 0.11
Expenditures δ3 0.05 Child ability δ4 0.5
Price of expenditures pe 0.1 Scaling factor R 1
Time Endowments
Description Parameter Value Description Parameter Value
Time end. TWH T d 50 Time end. OTWH T o 62
Table A.21. Parameter Values for Numerical Example with Logarithmic Utility
Notes: Time endowment TWH=8am-6pm,Monday through Friday; Time endowment OTWH=total
non-sleeping time-TWH=(24h-8h of sleep)*7-50 of TWH=112-50.
As can be seen in Figure A.4, the heterogeneity in φq2 tilts child care during TWH and hours
worked a little bit but, quantitatively, doesn’t come close to generating the patterns observed in
the data.
A.6 CES Utility with Nested CES Production
Given the assumptions made for Section 4.3, the household solves the following problem:
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Let λd be the multiplier on the budget constraint, λo1 be the multiplier on the time constraint
outside of TWH for mothers, λo2 be the multiplier on the time constraint outside of TWH for
fathers and µ be the multiplier on the child quality production constraint.
Then, the first-order conditions for leisure, consumption and child quality are given by:
ℓd1 : α
d
1(ℓ
d
1)
−σ = λdwq1 ℓ
o
1 : α
o
1(ℓ
o
1)
−σ = λo1
ℓd2 : α
d
2(ℓ
d
2)
−σ = λdwq2 ℓ
o
2 : α
o
2(ℓ
o
2)
−σ = λo2
c : α3c
−σ = λd k : α4k−σ = µ
Let (A,B,Bd, Bo) be defined as follows:
A ≡
[{
δd1(τ
d
1 )
ρd + δd2(τ
d
2 )
ρd
} ρ
ρd +
{
δo1(τ
o
1 )
ρo + δo2(τ
o
2 )
ρo
} ρ
ρo
] ζ
ρ
+ δ3e
ζ ,
B ≡
[{
δd1(τ
d
1 )
ρd + δd2(τ
d
2 )
ρd
} ρ
ρd +
{
δo1(τ
o
1 )
ρo + δo2(τ
o
2 )
ρo
} ρ
ρo
] ζ
ρ−1
,
Bd ≡
{
δd1(τ
d
1 )
ρd + δd2(τ
d
2 )
ρd
} ρ
ρd
−1
,
Bo ≡ {δo1(τ o1 )ρo + δo2(τ o2 )ρo} ρρo−1 .
Then the first-order conditions for child care and expenditures for children are given by:
τd1 :
(
BBd
A
)
µδd1k(τ
d
1 )
ρd−1 = λdwq1n τ
o
1 :
(
BBo
A
)
µδo1k(τ
o
1 )
ρo−1 = λo1n
τd2 :
(
BBd
A
)
µδd2k(τ
d
2 )
ρd−1 = λdwq2n τ
o
2 :
(
BBo
A
)
µδo2k(τ
o
2 )
ρo−1 = λo2n
e :
(
1
A
)
µδ3ke
ζ−1 = λdnpe
Focusing on child care outside of TWH for the mother and father and substituting out multipli-
ers using the first-order conditions for leisure and child quality, we get:
k1−σ =
αo1
α4
n
δo1
(
A
BBd
)
(τ o1 )
1−ρo
(ℓo1)
σ
,
k1−σ =
αo2
α4
n
δo2
(
A
BBd
)
(τ o2 )
1−ρo
(ℓo2)
σ
.
Combining these two and simplifying gives:(
τ o,q2
τ o,q1
)1−ρo
=
αo1
αo2
δo2
δo1
(
ℓo2
ℓo1
)σ
.
Using the time constraints outside of TWH to substitute out leisure for mothers and fathers
leads to equation (9) in the proof of Proposition 1.
A.6.1 Numerical examples
Figure 3 in the main text plots model predictions (dashed lines) and data (solid lines) by income
quintile for (a) child care during TWH, (b) child care outside of TWH, (c) hours worked and
(d) expenditures per child. In this simulation, the only source of heterogeneity across income
quintiles is father’s wage, wq2, taken from Table 7, row 2. In order to concentrate on the effect
of the elasticity of substitution, σ, the parameters n, λ and φ2 are set to their average values
(see Tables 7 and 6). Again, mother’s wage, wq1 = λwq2, and innate ability kq0 = γwq2, with
γ = 1. As in the previous simulation, productivity and preference parameters were allowed to
vary by gender. Finally, to get hours worked to be increasing and child care during TWH to be
decreasing, the parameter governing the elasticity of substitution between leisure, consumption
and child quality is set within σ ∈ (0, 1). This generates the desired result during TWH because
the substitution effect of a higher wage dominates the income effect. The exact parameter
values are given in Table A.22.
The parameters differ from the ones in the numerical example with logarithmic utility above
because the curvature parameter, σ, not only affects the slope but also the levels of child care,
hours worked and expenditures on children.
Finally, Figure 4 plots the results for the same parameter values as in the experiment in
Figure 3, but where δji ’s are allowed to vary with q. In particular, it is assumed that low in-
come fathers are relatively less productive and high income fathers more productive in child
care. To keep the overall returns to time investment identical across income quintiles, mother’s
productivities are adjusted accordingly. That is,
δj,11 = δ
j
1 + 2ε, δ
j,1
2 = δ
j
2 − 2ε,
δj,21 = δ
j
1 + ε, δ
j,2
2 = δ
j
2 − ε,
δj,3i = δ
j
i ,
δj,41 = δ
j
1 − ε, δj,42 = δj2 + ε,
δj,51 = δ
j
1 − 2ε, δj,52 = δj2 + 2ε,
where δji are given in Table A.22 and ε = 0.07.
Preference Parameters
Description Parameter Value Description Parameter Value
Elasticity of substitution σ 0.57
Mother’s leis. TWH αd1 0.23 Father’s leis. TWH αd2 0.35
Mother’s leis. OTWH αo1 0.18 Father’s leis. OTWH αo2 0.175
Consumption α3 0.19 Child quality α4 1
Productivity Parameters
Description Parameter Value Description Parameter Value
Mother’s child c. TWH δd1 0.3 Father’s child c. TWH δd2 0.145
Mother’s child c. OTWH δo1 0.3 Father’s child c. OTWH δo2 0.17
Expenditures δ3 0.05 Child ability δ4 0.05
Price of expenditures pe 0.1 Scaling factor R 1
Time Endowments
Description Parameter Value Description Parameter Value
Time end. TWH T d 50 Time end. OTWH T o 62
Table A.22. Parameter Values for Numerical Example with CES Utility and C-D Production
Notes: Time endowment TWH=8am-6pm,Monday through Friday; Time endowment OTWH=total
non-sleeping time-TWH=(24h-8h of sleep)*7-50 of TWH=112-50.
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